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impression that the Court of Appeals would limit the doctrine of State v.
Toney to the exact facts of that case. It is to be regretted that the court
felt compelled to undertake the task of limitation. Conceding that this
was a close case of statutory construction and recognizing that the
principal case does not contradict the syllabus of the Toney case, it is sub-
mitted that the holding is not in harmony with the construction of the
statute defining "anything of value" bearing the imprimatur of the
Supreme Court, nor with the purpose and intent of the embezzlement
statute. A.N.M.
CRIMINAL LAW - FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN
R.ECOMMENDATION OF MERCY
Defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree without a
recommendation of mercy. Error was claimed in the trial court's charge
to the jury on the recommendation of mercy and in its refusal to
charge as requested by the defendant. The trial court answered a ques-
tion propounded by the jury, as to whether or not they could consider
"sociological matters and environment" in recommending or refusing
to recommend mercy, by saying, "No, that has nothing to do with the
case." The Supreme Court held that the jury's discretion was limited
to the facts and circumstances of the case as disclosed by the evidence,
and hence there was no error in the trial court's ruling.'
Ohio G.C. sec. 12400 provides that first degree murder "shall be
punished by death unless the jury trying the accused recommend
mercy . . . " The court in the principal case follows the rule of
Howell v. State, holding that the jury is to be confined to the evidence
in exercising its discretion to recommend or withhold mercy.2 The
majority opinion in that case is severely criticized by Judge Robinson in
a strong dissenting opinion' which was based upon the absence of any
indication in the statute of a legislative intent to control the discretion
of the jury in any respect whatsoever.
Outside of Ohio the courts have held under similar statutes that the
discretion of the jury in giving or withholding a recommendation of
mercy is not confined or limited by any rule of law or by the evidence
or testimony of the case.4 The Georgia court has held that the discre-
'State v. Caldwell, 135 Ohio St. 424, 21 N.E. (2d) 343, 14 Ohio Op. 320 (x939)-
2 Howell v. State, oz Ohio St. 411, 131 N.E. 76, 17 A.L.R. xioS (19z).
'Rehfetd v. State, xoz Ohio St. 431, 131 N.E. 71z (1921); Howell v. State, 102
Ohio St. 411, at 424.
"Inza v. State, 7z Ga. z69 (1884)5 State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135, 134 Pac.
632, Ann. Cas. 1916 C 532, L.R.A. 1916 D 590 (1913); Cook v. State, 46 Fla. 36, 35 So.
665 (1903)5 Winston v. Un'!!ed States, 172 U.S. 303, 43 L.Ed. 456, 19 Sup. Ct. 21z
(9SgS)5 State v. King, x58 S.C. 2zi, 155 S.E. 409 (903).
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tion of the jury is not limited or confined in any case,' and that it may
recommend mercy "for any reason that should occur" to it.' A South
Carolina court has held it error to give examples of cases where the
recommendation of mercy would be justified because these instructions
would tend to limit the discretion of the jury.' The Supreme Court of
the United States has indicated that under an Act of Congress8 permit-
ting a jury to add "without capital punishment" to a verdict of guilty
of first degree murder, the jury may consider everything in its recom-
mendation because the decision is "committed by Congress to the sound
discretion of the jury and the jury alone."' In New Jersey, under a
similar statute,"0 the court held that a recommendation of mercy was
no part of the verdict and that the facts on which conviction was based
are not necessarily connected with the recommendation, nor does this
recommendation have to be suggested by the evidence.'1 However, the
New Jersey Legislature after that decision amended the statute to con-
fine the jury's discretionary power to the facts and circumstances pre-
sented in the evidence. 2 Probably this method would have been the
better approach in Ohio.
It has been held to be the best policy in several states to instruct the
jury as to its discretion in recommending or withholding mercy by
reading the statute."3 On this same ground, a mere reading of the
statute to the jury, either upon request of counsel or upon the court's
own motion, has been held to be sufficient instruction on the recom-
mendation of mercy. 4 These same courts have held that it was error
to instruct the jury that there must be mitigating circumstances to
sustain a recommendation of mercy. 5 The fact that the recommenda-
Williams v. State, sa9 Ga. 425, 46 S.E. 6z6 (1903).
°Duncan v. State, 141 Ga. 4, 80 S.E. 317 (1913), per curiam opinion.
' State v. Blakely, 158 S.C. 304, 1S5 S.E. 408 (1930).
8 Act of Congress, Jan. I5, 1897, c. 29 sec. i, 29 Stat. 487.
' Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303, 43 L.Ed. 456, 19 Sup. Ct. Z12 (1898).
"How far considerations of age, sex, ignorance, illness, or intoxication, of human passions
or weakness, of sympathy or clemency, or the irrevocableness of an executed sentence of
death, or an apprehension that explanatory facts may exist which have not been brought
to light, or any other consideration whatever, should be allowed weight in deciding the
question whether the accused should or should not be capitally punished, is committed by
the act of Congress to the sound discretion of the jury and of the jury alone."
"o New Jersey Pub. Laws (1916) p. 576.
"State v. Martin, 92 N.J.L. 436, io6 Atl. 380, 17 A.L.R. zo9o (sgsg).
'2 New Jersey Pub. Laws (s919) p. 303; State v. Carrigan, 93 N.J.L. 268, soS At.
365 (igsg).
a Garner v. State, z8 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835, 29 Am. St. Rep. 232 (8gx)i Lovett v.
State, 30 Fla. 142, i So. 550, 17 L.R.A. 705 (1892)5 Denham v. State, zz Fla. 664
(1886); Mann v. State, 2z Fla. 6on (1886); Cook v. State, 46 Fla. 36, 35 So. 665
(1903); Fogarty v. State, 8o Ga. 450, 5 S.E. 78z (x888).
"Fogarty v. State, So Ga. 450, 5 S.E. 78z (sSSS); Denham v. State, z2 Fla. 664
(1886).
"s Cohen v, State, 116 Ga. 573, 42 S.E. 781 (goz).
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tion or non-recommendation is not reviewable by the appellate courts, 6
that some courts refuse to allow evidence directed specifically toward a
recommendation of mercy,"7 and the statement that the recommenda-
tion of mercy is not an issue of the case,"5 coupled with the refusal of the
courts to charge on such evidence,'" would tend to indicate that this
recommendation is not based on the evidence presented in the case, but
rather on the jury's impression of the man himself."0
It has been said that "a career of crime, sociologically conceived, is
the culmination of a complex series of inevitable forces at work in the
physical and social environment of the individual."'" This statement
represents the almost universal present-day thought on this question.
Hence, it would seem best that the courts allow the jury to follow the
rule laid down by Saleilles. "When it comes to determining the pen-
alty, it is the entire man in totality of his moral nature that must be
considered and not the fragmentary and incidental part of himself that
has found expression in the crime committed. 2
E. P.T.
EQUITY
EQUITY - MUTUALITY IN SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
OF REQUIREMENTS CONTRACTS
The plaintiff, a gasoline station owner and operator, bought and
paid cash for stock in the defendant corporation, owner and operator
of a bus line, under a contract whereby the defendant promised to buy,
and plaintiff to sell, all the defendant's requirements of gasoline, oil and
grease at reduced prices, so long as the plaintiff should hold the stock.'
The plaintiff asked an injunction to prevent the defendant from pur-
chasing his requirements elsewhere. The injunction was granted, the
court holding that mutuality of obligation is not essential to the specific
" Hoppe v. State, 29 Ohio App. 467, 163 N.E. 715 (2928) Aiken v. State, 170
Ga. 895 ,14 S.E. 3 6S (1930).
"2 Ashbrook v. State, 49 Ohio App. z98, 197 N.E. 214 (93).
" dshbrook v. State, 49 Ohio App. 298, 197 N.E. z4 (1935)j State v. Martin,
9z N.J.L. 436, xo6 Atl. 385, 17 A.L.R. iogo (ixgi).
1'0 Supra, note x6.
"State v. Caldwdl, 13 Ohio Op. 98 (1938), overruled in 134 Ohio St. 424 (2939).
"A Brill and Payne (x ed. 1938), "THE ADOLESCENT COURT AND CRIME PREVEN-
TION," p. 13.
-0 SALEILLES (I ed. 1913), "INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNisnaEirr," p. x65.
" Note that this contract presents some features of an option, a unilateral contract,
and a bilateral contract. If it is construed as a bilateral contract, plaintiff would be con-
sidercd as promising in the alternative either to supply the defendant's requirements or to
sell his stock. Since either performance would be sufficient consideration if it alone were
bargained for, the promise is not illusory. I American Law Institute Restatement of op
J,aw of Contract,, §79.
